I INTRODUCTION
The proposed reforms to financial regulation in South Africa, as embodied in the Financial Sector Regulation Bill, (second draft, 10 December, 2014) ('FSR Bill'), represent the most important reforms to South Africa's financial regulatory architecture since the 1987 de Kock Commission. The degree to which these reforms succeed will determine the extent to which South Africa can maintain financial stability, and manage the effects of a future financial crisis.
The de Kock Commission's findings led to the creation of the Financial Rand, and a dual exchange rate system for South Africa (Pieter Cornelis Smit, 'Economics:
A Southern African Perspective', (1996) , p 421). The current proposed reforms introduce two regulators for the Republic's financial sector -a so-called 'Twin Peaks' regulatory model: a Prudential Authority, which 'will supervise the safety and soundness of banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions', and a Financial Sector Conduct Authority, which 'will supervise how financial services firms What follows is an analysis of the South African iteration of the model and where and how it differs from the Australian model in certain respects, including the inter-agency co-ordination arrangements, and the extent to which the FSR Bill adequately creates the conditions for such co-ordination.
Importantly, the FSR Bill expressly recognises that the purpose of the legislation is to 'maintain and enhance financial stability' and that its object is 'to achieve a financial system that works in the interests of financial customers, and supports balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic' (FSR Bill, Preamble and s 6, 'Object of this Act'). ', (28 February, 2013) Bondholders', (20 March, 2012, 11:58 am) , Forbes, p 1).
The Bill's focus on financial stability is supported by a definition of 'financial stability'. Section 4 provides that 'there is said to be "financial stability"' if:
(a) financial institutions generally provide financial products and financial services without interruption and are capable of continuing to do so; and (b) there is general confidence in their ability to continue to do so'.
Section 8 of the Bill contains provisions dealing with the functions of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) in relation to financial stability, and the method by which financial stability should be restored or maintained in the event of a systemic event. A definition of 'systemic event' is provided in s 1 of the Bill and serves as a counterpart to the definition of 'financial stability' in so far as it relates to the inability of a financial institution or a group of financial institutions 'to provide financial products and financial services' or 'a general failure of confidence of financial customers in the ability of one or more financial institutions to continue to provide financial products or services'.
Central to the 'Twin Peaks' model in South Africa is the creation of two regulators; namely, the Prudential Authority (Chapter 3 of the Bill) and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (Chapter 4 of the Bill). Each authority will be a juristic person; however, the Prudential Authority will be housed within the South African Reserve Bank ('SARB') and will operate 'within the administration of the Reserve Bank' (s 27(1)). Under s 46 of the FSR Bill:
'The Reserve Bank must provide the Prudential Authority with the personnel, accommodation, facilities, the use of assets and other services and resources that are determined in accordance with section 45(1).'
There are many elements that underpin the effectiveness of the 'Twin Peaks' system of financial regulation, under which there are separate regulators for prudential supervision and market conduct. These include a clear allocation of objectives and responsibilities between each regulator; effective co-ordination between the regulators; transparency and accountability on the part of each regulator; effective powers of supervision and enforcement; operational independence of each regulator (vis-à-vis the executive government); a sound governance system and adequate resources (Michael W. Taylor, '"Twin Peaks": A regulatory structure for the 4 new century', (December, 1995) , pp 1-3; Michael W. Taylor, 'The Road from "Twin Peaks" -and the Way Back', (2009 Back', ( -2010 (September, 2012) ). This note will focus on three fundamental questions by reference to the experience and current debate in Australia, which has recently undergone a comprehensive review of the financial system, known as the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) (Financial System Inquiry, 'Financial System Inquiry Final Report', (November, 2014) ). The FSI has generated debate around a number of fundamental issues, including the nature and structure of the system of financial regulation in Australia. The questions that arise for South Africa are as follows: (1) Under the FSR Bill, the Reserve Bank must deal with similarly competing priorities. Section 12 provides that when the Reserve Bank acts to prevent or manage a systemic risk, it must have due regard to various needs, including the need to 'protect and maintain financial stability', which may involve the continuing provision of financial products and financial services by financial institutions, the need to 'protect, as appropriate, financial customers' and the need to 'contain the cost to the Republic of the systemic event and the measures taken to manage it.' 6 An assessment of these factors may involve competing priorities and give rise to potential conflicts of interest. For example, the costs of a systemic event could potentially be lower in the event that a bank is deemed to have failed, and should exit. 'when the Fed tightens monetary policy, it becomes less strict in bank supervision (i.e., an increase in interest rates or a decrease in reserves is associated with a lower probability of intervention). One possible explanation is that the Fed tends to be less strict on bank supervision in order to compensate banks for the extra pressure it puts on them when it tightens monetary policy. The Fed might be interested in compensating troubled banks either because it is concerned about possible adverse effects from bank failures on its reputation or because it is concerned about possible knock-on effects.
After all, the Fed is responsible for maintaining the stability of the financial system and it is responsible for the supervision of some of the biggest banks in the United States.'
There is also evidence that an independent regulator leads to better macro- 'Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors:
The supervisor possesses operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance, budgetary processes that do not undermine autonomy and adequate resources, and is accountable for the discharge of its duties and use of its resources. The legal framework for banking supervision includes legal protection for the supervisor.'
Conversely, and from a practical perspective, there are benefits in housing the prudential regulator within the NCB. These include the ability to achieve synergies in relation to resources and expertise, and to avoid the difficulties that arise in relation to information-sharing that do not present where the central bank and the prudential regulator are one organisation. In addition, in jurisdictions that do not have a tradition of independent regulatory agencies, but do have a tradition of a strongly independent central bank, housing the prudential regulator within the NCB may ensure that it operates independently of government. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was a factor behind the proposed reforms in South Africa.
In Australia, the prudential regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulation The regulatory design in any country has to accommodate the specific circumstances and needs of that country. In South Africa's case, there are likely to be cogent reasons for housing the Prudential Authority within the SARB. To some extent, the FSR Bill overcomes some of the concerns identified above, by clearly stipulating the objectives and internal governance structures of the Prudential Authority. However, it will still be necessary to ensure that the PA achieves an appropriate level of operational independence in practice, and that the risks of conflicts of interest and competing priorities, as referred to above, are appropriately managed.
III HOW SHOULD EFFECTIVE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE REGULATORS BE ACHIEVED?

a. Regulatory Co-ordination -soft law vs hard law
Much has been written about soft law in the context of regulation, and its relative merits, as compared with hard law. For example, it has been said that regulators turn to soft law in financial regulation because of the 'sociological pull of soft law venues', the fact that soft law is 'quicker, cheaper and more flexible' and also that it is non- The soft law approach was also underscored in the Interim Report of the Australian Financial System Inquiry, which drew on the submission of the RBA in stating that '[l] egislation cannot be relied on to promote a culture of cooperation, trust and mutual support between domestic regulatory agencies. These have been highlighted as essential elements of an effective financial stability framework, especially during a crisis.' (Financial System Inquiry, 'Financial System Inquiry Interim Report', (July, 2014) , p 3-119).
Of greater importance to the regulators in Australia, the RBA has suggested, is cultivating a culture of co-ordination, under which the main focus is on regulatory performance, rather than regulatory structure. The Assistant Governor (Financial) of the RBA has attributed the efficacy of co-ordination between the regulators in Australia to a culture -'where we regard cooperation with the other agencies as an important part of our job, and there is a strong expectation from the public and the government that we will continue to do so…Key aspects 
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The soft law approach to regulatory co-ordination in Australia can be contrasted with the more prescriptive 'hard law' approach to regulatory co-ordination adopted in the United Kingdom as set out below, and the proposed approach in South Africa, as set out in Chapter 6 of the FSR Bill, particularly ss 76 and 77. Indeed, the preamble to the Bill provides expressly that one of its objects is 'to provide for coordination, co-operation, collaboration, consultation and consistency' between the regulatory authorities. In particular, the South African model borrows from the UK model in terms of prescribing the nature of co-ordination between the regulators, and imposing a statutory duty on the regulators to co-operate or co-ordinate their activities (the FSR Bill, s 76). This can be contrasted with Australia, where, although co-operation is referred to in the legislation governing APRA, there are no detailed provisions as to the nature of co-operation and how it should be achieved (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), (1998), s 10A). 
b. Regulatory Memoranda of Understanding
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The FSR Bill makes provision for a regulatory memorandum of understanding to be entered into by the regulatory authorities (see the FSR Bill, s 77). This will deal with various matters, including how the regulators and the Reserve Bank will comply with their duties to co-ordinate in practice, delegation of powers between the Prudential Authority and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority and how differences between them are to be resolved. In Australia, the understanding is that the memoranda of understanding between the regulators and between each regulator and the RBA are not legally binding. This would appear to be the case under the FSR Bill.
Arguably, the hard law nature of regulatory co-ordination in South Africa, involving a statutory duty to co-operate raises various concerns, including whether this approach will result in inflexibility (namely, an inability to adapt to circumstances as and when they arise), and a culture that is more concerned with compliance than in achieving appropriate outcomes. Our findings, derived from interviews conducted with the regulators in Australia, suggest that a flexible approach to co-ordination, able Empirical evidence suggests that the experience in Australia is that the memoranda of understanding do not have any practical effect or utility in terms of achieving the relevant outcomes, and that neither ASIC nor APRA relies strictly on the letter of the memoranda of understanding. Instead, the main value of the memoranda is in signalling to the public how the regulators intend to achieve effective co-ordination, and also the process by which they are reviewed from time to and accountability should be introduced into the regulatory system in Australia.
As outlined by the RBA in its submission to the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) -'The CFR is the coordinating body for Australia's main financial regulatory agencies. Its membership comprises APRA, ASIC, the RBA and the Treasury.
The CFR was established in 1998 following the recommendations of the previous Financial System Inquiry (the Wallis Inquiry). It is a non-statutory interagency body, and has no regulatory functions separate from those of its four members.
CFR meetings are chaired by the Reserve Bank Governor, with secretariat support provided by the RBA. They are typically held four times per year but can occur more frequently if required. As stated in the CFR Charter, the meetings provide a forum for:
• identifying important issues and trends in the financial system, including those that may impinge upon overall financial stability;
• ensuring the existence of appropriate coordination arrangements for responding to actual or potential instances of financial instability, and helping to resolve any issues where members' responsibilities overlap; and
• harmonising regulatory and reporting requirements, paying close attention to the need to keep regulatory costs to a minimum (CFR 2004 ).
Much of the input into CFR meetings is undertaken by interagency working groups, which has the additional benefit of promoting productive working relationships and an appreciation of cross-agency issues at the staff level.
The CFR has worked well since its establishment and, during the crisis in particular, it has proven to be an effective means of coordinating responses to potential threats to financial stability…
The experience since its establishment, and especially during the crisis, has highlighted the benefits of the existing non-statutory basis of the CFR.' One concern in having a statutory-based inter-agency co-ordinating body is that it might be treated as the only channel through which inter-agency co-ordination can be achieved. In this regard, it is relevant to note that s 79(4) of the FSR Bill provides that ' [t]his section does not limit the powers or duties of the Council of Financial
Regulators' constituent institutions, including other powers and duties in relation to consultation, co-operation and co-ordination.'
A further concern, which was expressed by the RBA in its submission to the FSI, is that 'formalising the CFR with explicit responsibilities and policy tools would Regulators to be 'seen as the collaborative dimension of the regulatory agencies' activities, rather than as a separate body with its own ability to make the regulatory agencies cooperate.' (Financial System Inquiry, 'Financial System Inquiry Interim Report', (July, 2014), p 3-119) . This is consistent with the approach of one of the regulators, expressed during interviews conducted by the authors, that giving formal co-ordination powers to the CFR may confuse accountability and require a more intrusive infrastructure, and that the system in Australia works well without one body directing the process. Further, what is critical to regulatory co-ordination is, at a formal level, the regular meetings of the Council of Financial Regulators and its working committees and, at an informal level, the relationship between the people involved (interviews with the regulators in July 2014).
In its submission, the RBA noted that although formal structures for coordination between agencies might assist to mediate the resolution of differences between regulatory agencies, and thereby enforce outcomes, 'it is unclear how reassigning part of a regulatory agency's constituent powers to an overarching body will influence coordination and effectiveness of regulatory policies. Similarly, it remains to be seen if formality is the feature of institutional arrangements that ensures better outcomes.' V SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The move in South Africa towards a 'Twin Peaks' model of financial regulation is a significant reform that should promote financial stability and strengthen South Africa's ability to manage and mitigate the effects of financial crises. The experience of Australia provides some insights into the challenges that this model presents, particularly in the area of regulatory co-ordination, and the various ways in which these challenges might be overcome. One of the key lessons suggested by the Australian experience is that the legislative and regulatory framework is a necessarybut, of itself, insufficient -element in terms of achieving the desired outcomes. Of equal importance is a 'culture of co-ordination' under which the main focus is on regulatory performance rather than regulatory structure. In this regard, the high-level, outcomes-focused and 'soft law' approach adopted in Australia offers an interesting contrast to the more prescriptive 'hard law' approach in the United Kingdom, and the proposed approach in South Africa. Of critical importance, this note suggests, is achieving an appropriate balance between formality and flexibility; namely, making clear provision for the nature and scope of regulatory co-ordination while at the same time ensuring that the system is sufficiently flexible to allow it to adapt to specific circumstances, as and when they arise. 
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